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National	  security	  agencies	  and	  other	  interested	  parties	  now	  often	  regard	  conflict	  as	  
the	  inevitable	  consequence	  of	  climate	  change.	  This	  inclination	  to	  reduce	  war	  to	  the	  
vicissitudes	  of	  climate	  is	  not	  new	  however.	  Here	  I	  examine	  some	  of	  the	  earlier	  ways	  
in	  which	  violence	  was	  attributed	  to	  climatic	  conditions,	  particularly	  in	  the	  United	  
States,	  and	  trace	  links	  between	  these	  older	  advocates	  of	  climatic	  determinism	  and	  
the	  recent	  writings	  of	  those	  insisting	  that	  climate	  change	  will	  usher	  in	  a	  grim	  world	  
of	  chronic	  warfare.	  It	  ends	  by	  drawing	  attention	  to	  the	  writings	  of	  some	  critics	  who	  




American	  Civil	  War,	  Arnold	  Toynbee,	  climate	  change,	  climatic	  determinism,	  Ellen	  
Semple,	  Ellsworth	  Huntington,	  John	  W.	  Draper,	  national	  security, Quincy	  Wright,	  





‘Climate	  Change	  will	  lead	  to	  an	  increased	  threat	  of	  war,	  violence	  and	  military	  action	  
against	  the	  UK	  and	  risks	  reversing	  the	  progress	  of	  civilisation’.1	  So	  readers	  of	  the	  
Guardian	  newspaper	  were	  told	  on	  6	  July	  2011,	  on	  the	  authority	  of	  Chris	  Huhne,	  then	  
Britain’s	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Energy	  and	  Climate	  Change.	  In	  recent	  years	  the	  idea	  
that	  climate	  change	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  major	  player	  on	  the	  world’s	  national	  
security	  stage	  has	  gripped	  the	  public	  imagination,	  even	  if,	  as	  Halvard	  Buhaug	  
recently	  pointed	  out	  in	  the	  pages	  of	  this	  journal,	  current	  ‘quantitative	  research	  on	  
climate	  and	  conflict’	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  ‘the	  two	  phenomena	  are	  not	  connected	  
in	  the	  simple	  and	  direct	  manner’	  that	  is	  often	  claimed.2	  Certainly	  the	  idea	  that	  
climate	  change	  breeds	  conflict	  is	  a	  refrain	  echoing	  its	  way	  through	  the	  recently-­‐
published	  book	  lists,3-­‐5	  and	  has	  featured	  prominently	  over	  the	  past	  decade	  and	  more	  
in	  a	  range	  of	  prominent	  government-­‐orientated	  reports	  by	  political	  analysts	  and	  
policy	  makers.6-­‐8	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In	  most	  of	  these	  narratives	  the	  tragic	  history	  of	  humanity’s	  future	  is	  reduced	  to	  
the	  vicissitudes	  of	  climate’s	  reign.	  Global	  warming,	  we	  are	  told,	  will	  mean	  a	  falling	  
food	  supply,	  and	  that	  means	  famine,	  death	  and	  war.	  Here	  climate	  is	  writing	  a	  script	  
that	  stars	  Malthus	  and	  Hobbes	  as	  the	  leading	  dramatis	  personae:	  exceed	  the	  world’s	  
climatically-­‐determined	  carrying	  capacity	  and	  countless	  millions	  live	  a	  life	  that’s	  
nasty,	  brutish	  and	  short.	  The	  result	  will	  be	  a	  profoundly	  differentiated	  world	  –	  the	  
fault-­‐line	  mostly	  running	  along	  a	  north-­‐south	  divide	  –	  rife	  with	  violence	  and	  conflict.	  
A	  sense	  of	  necessitarian	  inevitability	  weaves	  it	  way	  through	  many	  of	  these	  scenarios.	  	  
Hunting	  for	  connections	  between	  warfare	  and	  climate	  is	  not	  a	  new	  pastime,	  
however.	  To	  the	  contrary;	  it	  has	  a	  long	  genealogy.	  Revisiting	  something	  of	  this	  
history,	  I	  contend,	  is	  illuminating	  inasmuch	  as	  distance	  enables	  us	  to	  see	  with	  
particular	  clarity	  the	  ideological	  investment	  frequently	  exhibited	  by	  proponents	  of	  
the	  idea	  that	  war	  may	  be	  reduced	  to	  matters	  of	  climate.	  It	  may	  also	  enable	  us	  to	  
discern	  resonances	  between	  traditional	  climatic	  determinism	  and	  contemporary	  
climate	  change	  reductionism.	  By	  perusing	  the	  earlier	  prosecution	  of	  climatic	  
historicism,	  moreover,	  the	  moral	  components	  of	  climate-­‐warfare	  nexus	  are	  exposed	  
with	  particular	  clarity.	  The	  ways	  in	  which	  some	  of	  these	  earlier	  advocates	  of	  climatic	  
determinism	  could	  absolve	  history	  of	  ethical	  accountability	  by	  reducing	  war	  to	  
weather	  invites	  us	  to	  ponder	  whether	  a	  similar	  anaesthetizing	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  
might	  not	  be	  present	  amongst	  some	  contemporary	  proponents	  of	  climate	  
reductionism.	  
	  
CLIMATE	  AND	  CONFLICT:	  CONFIGURING	  CONNECTIONS	  
The	  idea	  that	  climate	  and	  conflict	  are	  causally	  connected	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  at	  least	  
to	  Hippocrates’	  (c.	  460	  BC	  –	  c.	  370	  BC)	  classic	  treatise	  on	  medical	  topography,	  On	  
Airs,	  Waters	  and	  Places,	  which	  famously	  asserted	  that	  ‘the	  principal	  reason	  the	  
Asiatics	  are	  more	  unwarlike	  …	  than	  the	  Europeans	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  seasons,	  
which	  do	  not	  undergo	  any	  great	  changes	  either	  to	  heat	  or	  cold’.9	  In	  Europe,	  
according	  to	  the	  Hippocratics,	  things	  were	  different.	  Here	  cowardice	  gave	  way	  to	  
courage,	  timidity	  to	  pugnacity.	  Why?	  Because	  European	  climates	  were	  remarkably	  
variable	  with	  hot	  summers,	  cold	  winters,	  frequent	  rains	  and	  droughts.	  As	  
Hippocrates	  explained,	  ‘a	  climate	  which	  is	  always	  the	  same	  induces	  indolence,	  but	  a	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changeable	  climate,	  laborious	  exertions	  both	  of	  body	  and	  mind;	  and	  from	  rest	  and	  
indolence	  cowardice	  is	  engendered,	  and	  from	  laborious	  exertions	  and	  pains,	  courage.	  
On	  this	  account	  the	  inhabitants	  of	  Europe	  are	  more	  warlike	  than	  the	  Asiatics’	  (Ref	  9,	  
part	  23).	  The	  reason,	  of	  course,	  was	  that	  climate	  exerted	  its	  influence	  through	  the	  
way	  it	  brought	  about	  an	  excess	  or	  deficiency	  in	  the	  bodily	  fluids	  known	  as	  the	  
humours	  –	  black	  bile,	  yellow	  bile,	  phlegm	  and	  blood	  –	  the	  disposition	  of	  which	  
conditioned	  individual	  and	  national	  temperaments.	  
The	  Hippocratic	  legacy	  of	  resorting	  to	  climatic	  humoralism	  as	  a	  means	  of	  
explaining	  warfare	  was	  deep	  and	  lasting,	  perhaps	  most	  famously	  resurfacing	  in	  
Montesquieu’s	  L’Esprit	  des	  Lois	  (1748).	  Here	  he	  reported	  that	  inhabitants	  of	  cold	  
climatic	  regimes	  exhibited	  a	  ‘bravery’	  signally	  lacking	  in	  the	  ‘inhabitants	  of	  warm	  
countries’	  who	  were	  ‘timorous’.	  This	  circumstance,	  of	  course,	  was	  directly	  relevant	  
to	  the	  conduct	  of	  war.	  As	  Montesquieu	  explained,	  ‘If	  we	  reflect	  on	  the	  late	  wars	  …	  
we	  shall	  find	  that	  the	  northern	  people,	  transplanted	  into	  southern	  regions,	  did	  not	  
perform	  such	  exploits	  as	  their	  countrymen	  who,	  fighting	  in	  their	  own	  climate,	  
possessed	  their	  full	  vigour	  and	  courage’.10	  	  
I	  do	  not	  propose	  to	  follow	  the	  twists	  and	  turns	  of	  that	  lengthy	  journey	  here	  
however;	  aspects	  of	  it	  have	  been	  treated	  elsewhere.12-­‐14	  Instead	  I	  want	  to	  pick	  up	  
the	  story	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	  centuries	  when	  climatic	  
determinism	  reached	  new	  heights.	  Two	  or	  three	  accounts	  of	  the	  American	  Civil	  War	  
will	  be	  my	  primary	  focus,	  not	  least	  because	  some	  writings	  from	  this	  period	  continue	  
to	  serve	  as	  reference	  points	  for	  today’s	  champions	  of	  the	  climate-­‐conflict	  thesis.	  	  
	  
Semple,	  Draper	  and	  the	  American	  Civil	  War	  
The	  spirit,	  if	  not	  the	  letter,	  of	  this	  tradition,	  mediated	  through	  Montesquieu,	  
manifested	  itself	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  the	  Kentucky	  geographer	  Ellen	  Churchill	  Semple	  
(1863-­‐1932).	  Semple	  was	  sure	  that	  climate	  not	  only	  modified	  human	  physiology,	  but	  
also	  governed	  the	  ‘temperament’	  and	  ‘energy’	  of	  different	  peoples	  and	  thus	  their	  
‘efficiency’	  as	  ‘political	  agents’.15	  By	  now,	  of	  course,	  the	  Hippocratic	  cosmos	  was	  
reworked	  into	  Darwinian	  categories.	  What	  she	  called	  the	  ‘climatic	  control’	  of	  the	  
ecology	  of	  human	  settlement	  only	  served	  to	  intensify	  ‘the	  struggle	  for	  existence’	  
between	  human	  groups	  (Ref.	  15,	  p.	  610).	  But	  it	  delivered	  the	  kind	  of	  polarized	  world	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ruptured	  along	  a	  north-­‐south	  divide	  only	  too	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  geo-­‐humoralists.	  For	  
Semple	  was	  certain	  that	  the	  ‘the	  greatest	  historical	  developments	  belong	  to	  the	  
North	  Temperate	  Zone’	  (Ref.	  15,	  p.	  611).	  The	  destiny	  of	  the	  world’s	  nations	  was	  thus	  
written	  in	  the	  naturalized	  language	  of	  zonal	  climate.	  ‘Nature	  has	  fixed	  the	  mutual	  
destiny	  of	  tropical	  and	  temperate	  zones’	  not	  least	  as	  ‘complementary	  trade	  zones’,	  
she	  insisted	  (Ref.	  15,	  p.	  616).	  Economically	  this	  meant	  that	  the	  ‘hot	  zone’	  acted	  as	  
supplier	  to	  the	  ‘Temperate	  Zone’	  which	  enjoyed	  ‘greater	  industrial	  efficiency’	  (Ref.	  
15,	  p.	  616).	  	  
But	  climate	  did	  not	  simply	  stimulate	  regionally	  diversified	  economies;	  it	  shaped	  
population	  geography	  too.	  Through	  the	  operations	  of	  ‘natural	  and	  artificial	  selection’	  
the	  ‘warm	  moist’	  climate	  of	  the	  Gulf	  and	  South	  Atlantic	  States,	  she	  reported,	  was	  
now	  ‘attracting	  back	  to	  the	  congenial	  habitat	  of	  the	  “black	  belt”’	  African-­‐Americans	  
from	  the	  Northern	  states,	  where	  ‘their	  numbers	  are	  being	  further	  depleted	  by	  a	  
harsh	  climate,	  which	  finds	  in	  them	  a	  large	  proportion	  of	  the	  unfit’	  (Ref.	  15,	  p.	  619).	  
This	  Darwinian	  gesture	  notwithstanding,	  the	  Montesquieuean	  vision	  persistently	  
reasserted	  itself.	  In	  the	  Old	  World	  the	  ‘influence	  of	  climate	  on	  race	  temperament’	  
had	  dramatically	  manifested	  itself.	  In	  Europe,	  ‘energetic,	  provident,	  serious,	  
thoughtful’	  northerners	  stood	  in	  marked	  contrast	  to	  the	  ‘southerners	  of	  the	  sub-­‐
tropical	  Mediterranean	  basin’	  whom	  she	  portrayed	  as	  ‘easy-­‐going,	  improvident	  …	  
emotional,	  imaginative’	  (Ref.	  15,	  p.	  620).	  It	  wasn’t	  difficult	  to	  transfer	  such	  regional	  
portraiture	  across	  the	  Atlantic.	  ‘The	  divergent	  development	  of	  Northerners	  and	  
Southerners	  in	  America	  arose	  from	  contrasts	  in	  climate,	  soil	  and	  area’	  Semple	  
announced.	  ‘It	  was	  not	  only	  the	  enervating	  heat	  and	  moisture	  of	  the	  Southern	  States,	  
but	  also	  the	  large	  extent	  of	  their	  fertile	  area	  which	  necessitated	  slave	  labor,	  
introduced	  the	  plantation	  system,	  and	  resulted	  in	  the	  whole	  aristocratic	  organization	  
of	  society	  in	  the	  South’	  (Ref.	  15,	  p.	  622).	  
The	  climatic	  mindset	  that	  Semple	  here	  elevated	  into	  lofty	  explanatory	  principle	  
had	  long	  been	  installed	  in	  her	  geopolitical	  outlook.	  She	  had	  already	  applied	  its	  
reductionist	  logic	  to	  explaining	  the	  circumstances	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  American	  Civil	  
War	  in	  her	  1903	  American	  History	  and	  its	  Geographic	  Conditions.16	  By	  causally	  
coupling	  climatic	  conditions	  with	  agricultural	  production	  Semple	  had	  a	  ready-­‐made	  
formula	  for	  explaining	  the	  sources	  of	  a	  war	  whose	  frontier	  zone	  ran	  along	  ‘a	  climatic	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line’	  dividing	  an	  urban	  North	  from	  a	  rural	  South	  (Ref.	  16,	  p.	  346).	  It	  was	  a	  simple	  
enough	  equation:	  history	  reduced	  to	  geography.	  For	  what	  she	  called	  ‘sectional	  
feeling’	  had	  its	  origins	  ‘in	  difference	  of	  climate	  and	  soil’	  (Ref.	  16,	  284).	  To	  Semple,	  
then,	  politics	  followed	  pedology;	  slavery	  was	  a	  matter	  of	  soil;	  conflict	  boiled	  down	  to	  
climate.	  As	  she	  explained:	  
	  
The	  question	  of	  slavery	  in	  the	  United	  States	  was	  primarily	  a	  question	  of	  climate	  
and	  soil	  …	  The	  morale	  of	  the	  institution,	  like	  the	  right	  of	  succession,	  was	  long	  a	  
mooted	  question,	  until	  New	  England,	  having	  discovered	  the	  economic	  unfitness	  
of	  slave	  industry	  for	  her	  boulder-­‐strewn	  soil	  took	  the	  lead	  in	  the	  crusade	  against	  
it.	  The	  South,	  by	  the	  same	  token	  of	  geographical	  conditions,	  but	  conditions	  
favorable	  to	  the	  plantation	  system	  which	  along	  made	  slave	  labor	  profitable,	  
upheld	  the	  institution	  both	  on	  economic	  and	  moral	  grounds	  (Ref.	  16,	  p.	  280).	  
	  
Semple	  was	  not	  the	  first	  to	  deliver	  a	  climatic	  reading	  of	  the	  Civil	  War	  however.	  
John	  William	  Draper’s	  three-­‐volume	  History	  of	  the	  American	  Civil	  War,	  which	  
appeared	  in	  1867,	  had	  already	  foregrounded	  climate	  as	  the	  conflict’s	  explanans	  par	  
excellence.17	  Draper	  (1811-­‐1882),	  President	  of	  New	  York	  University	  from	  1850	  to	  
1873,	  professor	  of	  chemistry,	  and	  architect	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘conflict	  model’	  of	  
science	  and	  religion,	  brought	  a	  scientist’s	  eye	  to	  the	  task.	  Right	  upfront	  he	  
announced	  ‘the	  great	  truth	  that	  societies	  advance	  in	  a	  preordained	  and	  inevitable	  
course’	  on	  account	  of	  ‘uncontrollable	  causes’	  (Ref.	  17,	  vol.	  1,	  p.	  iii).	  And	  chief	  among	  
these	  was	  climate,	  a	  subject	  that	  dominated	  the	  first	  volume	  of	  his	  history	  which	  was	  
designed	  to	  	  “set	  forth	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  war”	  (Ref.	  17,	  vol.	  1,	  p.	  v).	  
Like	  Montesquieu,	  Draper	  was	  convinced	  that	  climate	  exercised	  its	  global	  imperial	  
power	  via	  human	  physiology	  which,	  in	  turn,	  conditioned	  regional	  character.	  	  It	  
delivered	  a	  literal	  Weltschauung	  –	  world-­‐view	  –	  suffused	  with	  the	  lingering	  
aftertaste	  of	  Renaissance	  geo-­‐humoralism:	  	  
	  
The	  nations	  of	  men	  are	  arranged	  by	  climate	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  earth	  in	  bands	  
that	  have	  a	  most	  important	  physiological	  relation.	  In	  the	  torrid	  zone,	  intellectual	  
development	  does	  not	  advance	  beyond	  the	  stage	  of	  childhood	  …	  In	  the	  warmer	  
  6	  
portions	  of	  the	  temperate	  zone,	  the	  stage	  of	  youth	  and	  commencing	  manhood	  is	  
reached.	  …	  Along	  the	  cooler	  portions	  of	  that	  zone,	  the	  character	  attained	  is	  that	  
of	  individual	  maturity,	  staid	  sobriety	  of	  demeanor,	  reflective	  habits,	  tardy	  action	  
(Ref.	  17,	  vol.	  1,	  pp.	  101-­‐102).	  	  
	  
For	  Draper,	  then,	  zonal	  climate,	  bodily	  organization	  and	  mental	  character	  were	  
tightly	  knitted	  together.	  And	  this	  coalition,	  when	  combined	  with	  the	  direct	  impact	  of	  
seasonal	  variation	  in	  different	  latitudes,	  translated	  into	  distinct	  economic	  regimes.	  	  
The	  argument	  now	  flowed	  in	  predictable	  channels.	  Draper	  wanted	  his	  readers	  to	  
be	  clear	  that	  the	  ‘differentiation’	  of	  the	  American	  nation	  ‘into	  two	  sections	  …	  the	  
free	  and	  the	  slave	  powers’	  had	  been	  effected	  ‘chiefly	  through	  the	  agency	  of	  climate’	  
(Ref.	  17,	  vol.	  1,	  p.20).	  And	  this	  climate-­‐driven	  disjunction	  had	  produced	  a	  geopolitical	  
bi-­‐polarity	  ripe	  for	  internecine	  hostility.	  ‘A	  self-­‐conscious	  democracy,	  animated	  by	  
ideas	  of	  individualism,	  was	  the	  climate	  issue	  in	  the	  North’	  he	  declared;	  ‘an	  
aristocracy,	  produced	  by	  sentiments	  of	  personal	  independence	  and	  based	  upon	  
human	  slavery,	  was	  the	  climate	  issue	  in	  the	  South’	  (Ref.	  17,	  vol.	  1,	  p.	  21).	  It	  was	  
climate	  that	  had	  ‘separated	  the	  American	  nation	  into	  two	  sections’;	  it	  was	  climate	  
that	  ‘had	  made	  a	  North	  and	  a	  South’;	  it	  was	  climate	  that	  had	  cultivated	  ‘the	  distinctly	  
marked’	  political	  instincts	  of	  each	  culture	  (Ref.	  17,	  vol.	  1,	  p.	  361).	  It	  could	  all	  be	  
captured	  in	  a	  formula	  approaching	  a	  climatic	  syllogism:	  ‘Climate	  tendencies	  facilitate	  
the	  abolition	  of	  slavery	  in	  a	  cold	  country,	  but	  oppose	  it	  in	  one	  that	  is	  warm’	  (Ref.	  17,	  
vol.	  1,	  p.	  342).	  Not	  surprisingly,	  in	  a	  major	  section	  of	  the	  book	  entitled	  ‘Tendency	  to	  
Antagonism	  Impressed	  on	  the	  American	  Population	  by	  Climate	  and	  Other	  Causes’,	  
Draper	  highlighted	  how	  the	  climate	  had	  produced	  two	  cultures	  intrinsically	  
‘antagonistic’	  to	  each	  other	  (Ref.	  17,	  vol.	  1,	  p.	  243).	  
It	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  discern	  the	  appeal	  of	  climatic	  destinism.	  It	  delivered	  
explanatory	  simplicity,	  political	  self-­‐justification,	  and	  ethical	  absolution.	  For	  the	  
sense	  of	  eschatological	  inevitability	  in	  humanity’s	  following	  a	  script	  written	  in	  the	  
main	  by	  climate	  brought	  with	  it	  a	  sense	  of	  moral	  relief.	  As	  Draper	  put	  it:	  ‘Now	  when	  
we	  appreciate	  how	  much	  the	  actions	  of	  men	  …	  are	  determined	  by	  climate	  and	  other	  
natural	  circumstances,	  our	  animosities	  lose	  much	  of	  their	  asperity,	  and	  the	  return	  of	  
kind	  feelings	  is	  hastened’	  (Ref.	  17,	  vol.	  1,	  p.	  iii).	  Climate’s	  actions	  had	  the	  effect	  of	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freeing	  political	  history	  from	  the	  burdens	  of	  moral	  accountability.	  Naturalizing	  the	  
causes	  of	  the	  civil	  war	  was	  thus	  a	  key	  means	  of	  fostering	  in	  the	  post-­‐bellum	  era	  what	  
he	  called	  ‘more	  philosophical,	  more	  enlarged,	  more	  enlightened,	  and,	  in	  truth,	  more	  
benevolent	  views	  of	  each	  other’s	  proceedings’	  (Ref.	  17,	  vol.	  1,	  p.	  47).	  For	  by	  
displaying	  to	  the	  world	  how	  climate	  had	  ghost-­‐written	  different	  histories	  in	  North	  
and	  South,	  Draper,	  as	  his	  biographer	  Donald	  Fleming	  put	  it,	  ‘drew	  the	  sting	  from	  any	  
moral	  recrimination’.	  ‘Indeed’,	  Fleming	  goes	  on,	  ‘one	  might	  suppose	  that	  the	  chief	  
convenience	  –	  and	  possibly	  the	  chief	  defect	  –	  of	  the	  “climatic”	  view	  of	  history	  was	  to	  
by-­‐pass	  ethical	  concerns	  altogether’.18	  
	  
Huntington,	  conflict	  and	  climate	  change	  
In	  elaborating	  his	  climatic	  philosophy	  of	  history,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	  
influential,	  if	  maverick,	  Yale	  geographer	  Ellsworth	  Huntington	  (1876-­‐1947)	  would	  
also	  cast	  his	  eye	  from	  time	  to	  time	  on	  the	  slave	  question.	  In	  his	  1915	  manifesto,	  
Civilization	  and	  Climate,	  for	  example,	  he	  insisted	  that	  in	  accounting	  for	  the	  contrasts	  
between	  the	  northern	  and	  southern	  states,	  ‘climatic	  effects’	  were	  the	  most	  ‘potent’.	  
‘Slavery,’	  he	  judged,	  ‘failed	  to	  flourish	  in	  the	  North	  not	  because	  of	  any	  moral	  
objection	  to	  it,	  for	  the	  most	  godly	  Puritans	  held	  slaves,	  but	  because	  the	  climate	  
made	  it	  unprofitable’.19	  What	  on	  the	  surface	  looked	  like	  a	  question	  of	  high	  moral	  
principle,	  turned	  out	  to	  a	  case	  of	  low	  economic	  pragmatism.	  Morality	  was	  a	  mere	  
matter	  of	  meteorology.	  	  
Thirty	  years	  later,	  in	  1945,	  he	  was	  still	  pushing	  economic	  climatology	  as	  the	  
fundamental	  reason	  for	  the	  South’s	  underdevelopment.	  And	  again	  the	  reduction	  of	  
ethical	  sentiment	  to	  the	  vagaries	  of	  the	  weather	  surfaced	  with	  renewed	  vigour.	  ‘The	  
suppression	  of	  slavery	  in	  the	  North	  was	  not	  due	  chiefly	  to	  moral	  conviction’	  he	  
pronounced.	  ‘That	  arose	  after	  long	  experience	  had	  shown	  that	  slavery	  did	  not	  pay	  in	  
a	  cool	  climate’.	  In	  the	  South	  the	  weather	  was	  different,	  and	  so	  were	  the	  racial	  
politics.	  It	  was	  the	  ‘warm,	  unstimulating	  weather’	  that	  fostered	  entirely	  different	  
‘social	  ideals’	  south	  of	  the	  Mason-­‐Dixon	  line.	  Naturally	  –	  or	  better,	  naturalistically	  –	  
the	  South	  ‘favored	  slavery	  and	  attached	  a	  social	  stigma	  to	  work	  with	  the	  hands’.	  So,	  
to	  Huntington,	  it	  was	  plain	  for	  all	  to	  see	  that	  ‘climatic	  contrasts	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  
civil	  war’.20	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Huntington’s	  reading	  of	  the	  American	  Civil	  War	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  climate	  was	  
fully	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  outlook	  of	  writers	  like	  Draper	  and	  Semple.	  But	  in	  other	  ways	  
he	  moved	  beyond	  their	  rather	  static	  climatic	  historicism	  by	  headlining	  the	  role	  that	  
climate	  change	  played	  in	  the	  history	  of	  conflict	  and	  civil	  unrest.	  As	  such	  he	  occupies	  
a	  pivotal	  position	  in	  the	  transition	  to	  more	  recent	  anxieties	  over	  climate	  change	  and	  
violent	  conflict.	  What	  is	  important	  though	  is	  that,	  for	  Huntington,	  climate	  and	  
climate-­‐change	  determinism	  were	  all-­‐of-­‐a-­‐piece.	  In	  both	  cases	  history	  was	  driven	  by	  
the	  vagaries	  of	  climate.	  
Huntington	  was	  long	  convinced	  about	  the	  evidence	  for	  historic	  climate	  change,	  
not	  least	  from	  tree-­‐ring	  analysis,	  and	  from	  as	  early	  as	  1907,	  he	  urged	  that	  the	  
climatic	  ‘pulsations’	  he	  believed	  he	  had	  detected	  played	  a	  profoundly	  influential	  role	  
in	  human	  affairs.21	  And	  so,	  in	  The	  Pulse	  of	  Asia	  –	  a	  work	  part	  travelogue,	  part	  
ethnographic	  depiction,	  part	  geographical	  description	  and	  based	  on	  a	  Carnegie-­‐
sponsored	  expedition	  –	  he	  set	  out	  to	  show	  how	  ‘disorder,	  wars,	  and	  migrations’	  had	  
arisen	  in	  concert	  with	  climatic	  oscillations	  (Ref.	  21,	  p.	  16).	  Quite	  simply	  it	  was	  a	  
changing	  ‘climate	  which	  almost	  irresistibly	  tempts	  the	  Arab	  to	  be	  a	  plunderer	  as	  well	  
as	  a	  nomad’	  (Ref.	  21,	  p.	  6).	  But	  his	  eye	  –	  or	  what	  James	  Rodger	  Fleming	  dubs	  his	  
‘overheated	  imagination’	  –	  strayed	  into	  other	  spatial	  and	  temporal	  zones	  too	  (Ref	  12,	  
p	  97).	  Europe’s	  ‘relapse’	  during	  the	  Dark	  Ages	  was	  on	  account	  of	  ‘a	  rapid	  change	  of	  
climate	  in	  Asia	  and	  probably	  all	  over	  the	  world’	  inducing	  violent	  ‘barbarian’	  
migration	  (Ref.	  21,	  p.	  5).	  To	  Huntington,	  as	  he	  scanned	  the	  global	  horizon,	  this	  meant	  
there	  were	  contemporary	  lessons	  to	  be	  learned.	  It	  all	  boiled	  down	  to	  one	  conclusion:	  
‘long-­‐continuing	  changes	  of	  climate	  have	  been	  one	  of	  the	  controlling	  causes	  of	  the	  
rise	  and	  fall	  of	  the	  great	  nations	  of	  the	  world’	  (Ref.	  21,	  p.	  382).	  
A	  dominant	  theme	  in	  the	  Huntington	  scenario	  was	  already	  now	  surfacing	  –	  the	  
violent	  political	  economy	  of	  progressive	  desiccation.	  Huntington	  believed	  he	  had	  
amassed	  a	  large	  body	  of	  data	  showing	  that	  ‘during	  the	  last	  two	  thousand	  years	  there	  
has	  been	  a	  widespread	  and	  pronounced	  tendency	  toward	  aridity’	  (Ref.	  21,	  pp.	  13-­‐14).	  	  
With	  an	  all-­‐too-­‐eager	  proclivity	  for	  elevating	  the	  particular	  into	  the	  universal	  he	  
promptly	  outlined	  a	  general	  law:	  ‘In	  relatively	  dry	  regions	  increasing	  aridity	  is	  a	  dire	  
calamity,	  giving	  rise	  to	  famine	  and	  distress.	  These,	  in	  turn,	  are	  fruitful	  causes	  of	  wars	  
and	  migrations’	  (Ref.	  21,	  p.	  14).	  Desiccation	  had	  determined	  the	  shape	  of	  human	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history	  time	  and	  time	  again	  by	  dictating	  the	  direction	  in	  which	  the	  whole	  narrative	  
moved.	  The	  specifics	  of	  Chinese	  Turkestan	  could	  stand	  as	  proxy	  for	  global	  history	  
and	  so	  with	  the	  enthusiasm	  of	  a	  new	  convert	  who	  has	  stumbled	  upon	  a	  universal	  
truth	  he	  announced:	  ‘Everywhere	  in	  arid	  regions	  we	  find	  evidence	  that	  desiccation	  
has	  caused	  famines,	  depopulation,	  raids,	  wars,	  migrations,	  and	  the	  decay	  of	  
civilization’	  (Ref.	  21,	  p.	  379).	  
Huntington	  returned	  to	  the	  subject	  in	  1926	  in	  The	  Pulse	  of	  Progress,	  a	  work	  which	  
dealt	  centrally	  with	  Jewish	  history.22	  Inferential	  though	  he	  admitted	  his	  theory	  to	  be,	  
Huntington	  was	  sure	  that	  population	  movements,	  invasions,	  and	  raids	  were	  all	  
attributable	  to	  a	  drying	  climate.	  The	  Libyan	  and	  Edomite	  incursions	  into	  Egypt	  
around	  the	  first	  millennium	  B.C.,	  for	  example,	  occurred	  during	  a	  time	  of	  ‘pronounced	  
aridity’	  (Ref.	  22,	  p.	  130).	  In	  China	  too,	  the	  ‘half	  century	  of	  increasing	  aridity	  from	  250	  
to	  200	  B.C.	  was	  a	  time	  of	  constant	  invasions	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  barbarian	  nomads	  of	  
the	  north	  and	  west’	  (Ref.	  22,	  p.	  134).	  All	  this	  pointed	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  periodic	  
climatic	  changes	  needed	  to	  be	  accorded	  a	  far	  more	  prominent	  role	  in	  historical	  
explanations	  of	  violence	  and	  war.	  Later,	  in	  support	  of	  his	  thesis	  he	  set	  about	  
correlating	  Arnold	  Toynbee’s	  catalogue	  of	  ‘historic	  migrations	  of	  nomads	  from	  the	  
deserts	  and	  steppes	  of	  Asia	  and	  Africa’	  with	  cycles	  of	  tree	  ring	  growth,	  changing	  lake	  
levels	  and	  the	  like	  (Ref.	  20,	  p.	  562).	  
Desiccating	  climatic	  regimes	  of	  course	  did	  not	  just	  incite	  conflicts	  across	  territorial	  
frontiers	  moreover;	  they	  also	  provoked	  civil	  unrest.	  In	  Turkey,	  for	  instance,	  
Huntington	  urged	  that	  the	  agricultural	  consequences	  of	  increasing	  aridity	  meant	  that	  
local	  farmers	  often	  resisted	  tax	  ‘officials	  and	  their	  minions’	  who	  ‘would	  employ	  force	  
and	  extortion’	  in	  their	  efforts	  to	  extract	  dues.	  Conditions	  like	  these	  could	  easily	  
breed	  insurrection,	  and	  Huntington	  was	  sure	  that	  ‘many	  civil	  commotions’	  were	  
stimulated	  by	  ‘the	  discontent’	  that	  prolonged	  periods	  of	  unfavourable	  weather	  and	  
poor	  crops	  inevitably	  induced	  (Ref.	  20,	  p.	  224).	  	  
	  
Huntington’s	  long	  shadow	  
While	  Huntington	  was	  often	  disparaged	  for	  his	  tendency	  to	  overgeneralise	  ad	  libitum,	  
to	  keep	  fact	  rather	  too	  subservient	  to	  theory,	  to	  downplay	  human	  agency,	  and	  to	  
display	  a	  troubling	  methodological	  naivety,	  his	  influence	  has	  continued	  to	  linger	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amongst	  those	  coupling	  climate	  and	  conflict	  in	  causal	  ways.	  Arnold	  Toynbee	  (1889-­‐
1975),	  for	  example,	  confessed	  that	  he	  had	  been	  ‘enormously	  influenced’23	  by	  
Huntington	  whom	  he	  described	  as	  ‘one	  of	  our	  most	  distinguished	  and	  original-­‐
minded	  students	  of	  the	  physical	  environment	  of	  human	  life’.24	  He	  found	  compelling	  
Huntington’s	  claim	  that	  weather	  conditions	  drifting	  from	  desiccation	  to	  humidity	  
provided	  a	  convincing	  explanation	  of	  why	  ‘the	  Mongols	  erupted	  on	  all	  fronts	  with	  an	  
unprecedented	  vehemence	  in	  the	  thirteenth	  century’	  (Ref.	  24,	  vol.	  3,	  p.	  440).	  	  
In	  his	  magnum	  opus,	  A	  Study	  of	  War,	  first	  published	  during	  the	  second	  world	  war	  
in	  1942,	  the	  American	  political	  scientist,	  Quincy	  Wright	  (1890-­‐1970),	  brother	  of	  the	  
celebrated	  geneticist	  Sewall	  Wright,	  likewise	  found	  inspiration	  in	  Huntington’s	  
thesis.25	  Besides	  referring	  to	  his	  work	  on	  climatic	  oscillations,	  Wright	  turned	  to	  
Huntington’s	  World	  Power	  and	  Evolution	  in	  support	  of	  the	  direct	  causal	  connection	  
between	  climatic	  conditions	  and	  warlike	  impulses	  applying	  this	  naturalistic	  
explanation	  in	  particular	  to	  what	  he	  called	  ‘primitive	  peoples’	  (Ref.	  25,	  p.	  354).	  It	  was	  
a	  general	  principle:	  ‘a	  temperate	  or	  warm,	  somewhat	  variable,	  and	  stimulating	  
climate	  favors	  warlikeness	  …	  Among	  contemporary	  primitive	  people	  the	  largest	  
proportion	  of	  the	  warlike	  live	  in	  hot	  regions	  of	  medium	  climatic	  energy’	  (Ref.	  25,	  p.	  
63).	  
Huntington-­‐style	  connections	  between	  climate,	  conflict	  and	  energetics	  likewise	  
captured	  the	  imagination	  of	  Sir	  Sydney	  Frank	  Markham	  (1897-­‐1975)	  British	  politician,	  
ex-­‐serviceman,	  and	  local	  historian.	  	  Markham	  was	  obviously	  in	  close	  contact	  with	  
Huntington	  for	  in	  the	  preface	  to	  his	  1942	  Climate	  and	  the	  Energy	  of	  Nations	  he	  
thanked	  him	  for	  ‘much	  excellent	  advice	  and	  for	  undertaking	  the	  arduous	  task	  of	  
proofreading’.26	  Markham	  was	  convinced	  that	  the	  mental	  and	  physical	  ‘energy’	  of	  
different	  nations	  was	  indeed	  critically	  dependent	  on	  climate.	  And	  to	  substantiate	  
that	  suspicion	  he	  turned	  his	  attention	  to	  the	  American	  South.	  In	  his	  view,	  
Southerners	  had	  adapted	  too	  fully	  to	  the	  hot	  climate	  of	  the	  South	  by	  developing	  ‘a	  
life-­‐long	  habit	  of	  acting	  more	  slowly	  than	  the	  Northerners’	  –	  a	  behavioural	  trait	  that	  
had	  stunted	  economic	  growth	  and	  retarded	  social	  progress	  (Ref.	  26,	  p.	  180).	  Back	  in	  
the	  days	  of	  the	  Civil	  War	  the	  self-­‐same	  forces	  had	  been	  at	  work.	  The	  North	  enjoyed	  
‘great	  climatic	  advantages’	  and	  ‘an	  infinitely	  greater	  industrial	  capacity’	  which	  meant	  
that	  ‘the	  whole	  economy	  of	  the	  South	  …	  seemed	  to	  be	  at	  a	  standstill,	  whilst	  the	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bounding,	  enterprising	  North	  went	  farther	  ahead’	  (Ref.	  26,	  p.	  163).	  	  
Huntington’s	  name	  could	  surely	  be	  fished	  out	  of	  many	  climate-­‐related	  
publications	  in	  the	  decades	  that	  followed.	  An	  exhaustive	  trawl,	  while	  no	  doubt	  
illuminating,	  is	  not	  my	  quarry	  here	  however.	  Suffice	  to	  record	  that	  his	  work	  remains	  
an	  anchor-­‐point	  for	  discussions,	  both	  scholarly	  and	  popular,	  of	  climate	  and	  conflict.	  
Recent	  writers,	  of	  course,	  routinely	  recoil	  from	  his	  judgmental	  historicist	  mindset	  
and	  claim	  to	  eschew	  the	  racial	  biases	  that	  were	  woven	  into	  the	  fabric	  of	  his	  
understanding	  of	  human	  culture.	  Nonetheless	  his	  name	  continues	  to	  crop	  up	  in	  
diagnostic	  statements	  on	  how	  climate	  is	  said	  to	  provoke	  warfare.	  David	  Zhang	  and	  
his	  colleagues,	  for	  example,	  present	  his	  Pulse	  of	  Asia	  as	  the	  first	  record	  in	  the	  ‘long-­‐
standing	  scholarly	  tradition’	  that	  showed	  ‘organized	  armed	  conflicts	  and	  climate	  
change	  are	  correlated’.27	  Jeffrey	  Mazo	  too,	  author	  Climate	  Conflict	  (2010),	  stages	  
Huntington	  as	  the	  ‘first	  modern	  scholar	  to	  develop	  a	  coherent	  theory	  of	  
environmental	  factors	  as	  a	  driver	  of	  history’.28	  But	  comprehensive	  inventory	  is	  not	  
my	  purpose.	  It	  is	  simply	  to	  redraw	  attention	  to	  the	  lengthy	  shadow	  that	  Huntington-­‐
shaped	  environmental	  causation	  casts	  over	  writing	  on	  climate	  and	  war	  in	  many	  
different	  registers.	  For	  in	  this	  intellectual	  genealogy	  the	  force	  lines	  connecting	  
classical	  climate	  determinism	  with	  contemporary	  climate	  change	  reductionism	  are	  
exposed	  with	  particular	  clarity.	  
	  
DISSENTING	  VOICES	  
The	  fashion	  for	  reducing	  war	  to	  climate	  has	  had	  a	  remarkable	  resurgence	  in	  recent	  
years	  stimulated	  in	  part	  by	  the	  proclivities	  of	  funding	  agencies	  and	  the	  priorities	  of	  
national	  governments.	  Not	  least	  is	  this	  the	  case	  with	  national	  security	  agencies.	  As	  
the	  British	  Foreign	  Secretary,	  Margaret	  Beckett,	  put	  it	  in	  2007	  in	  her	  presentation	  to	  
the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  first-­‐ever	  debate	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  climate	  change:	  the	  
consequences	  of	  climate	  change	  ‘reach	  to	  the	  very	  heart	  of	  the	  security	  agenda’.39	  A	  
few	  years	  earlier	  in	  their	  report	  to	  the	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  on	  
abrupt	  climate	  change	  and	  ‘Its	  implications	  for	  United	  States	  National	  Security’,	  
Peter	  Schwartz	  and	  Doug	  Randall	  insisted	  that	  in	  the	  near	  future	  ‘disruption	  and	  
conflict	  will	  be	  endemic	  features	  of	  life’.30	  Once	  the	  preserve	  of	  classical	  thinkers,	  
Enlightenment	  philosophers,	  and	  turn-­‐of-­‐the-­‐century	  geo-­‐historians,	  ‘the	  allure	  of	  a	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naïve	  climatic	  determinism	  is	  now	  seducing’	  –	  in	  Mike	  Hulme’s	  words	  –	  ‘those	  hard-­‐
nosed	  and	  most	  unsentimental	  of	  people	  …	  the	  military	  and	  their	  advisors’.31	  And	  it	  
is	  seducing	  other	  publicists	  too.	  Drawing	  on	  the	  neo-­‐Malthusian	  analyses	  of	  Thomas	  
Homer-­‐Dixon,32-­‐34	  whom	  he	  credited	  with	  officiating	  at	  the	  marriage	  of	  ‘military-­‐
conflict	  studies	  and	  the	  study	  of	  the	  physical	  environment’,35	  Robert	  Kaplan	  
announced	  that	  ‘We	  all	  must	  learn	  to	  think	  like	  Victorians	  …	  Geographical	  
determinists	  must	  be	  seated	  at	  the	  same	  honored	  table	  as	  liberal	  humanists’.36	  This	  
reductionist	  impulse,	  however,	  has	  not	  met	  with	  universal	  approval.	  	  
A	  team	  of	  research	  ecologists	  based	  mostly	  at	  Colorado	  State	  University,	  for	  
example,	  has	  challenged	  the	  suggestion	  that	  warming	  has	  increased	  the	  risk	  of	  civil	  
war	  in	  Africa.	  They	  argue	  that	  attributing	  such	  causal	  powers	  to	  climate	  
‘oversimplifies	  systems	  affected	  by	  many	  geopolitical	  and	  social	  factors’.	  And	  they	  
point	  out	  that	  ‘unrelated	  geopolitical	  trends’	  –	  most	  notably	  decolonization	  and	  the	  
legacy	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  –	  which	  ‘perturbed	  the	  political	  and	  social	  landscape	  of	  the	  
African	  continent’	  tend	  to	  be	  ignored	  in	  climate	  reductionist	  agendas.37	  Halvard	  
Buhaug,	  a	  political	  scientist	  at	  the	  Peace	  Research	  Institute	  Oslo,	  together	  with	  
colleagues	  also	  have	  serious	  reservations	  about	  what	  might	  be	  called	  climatic	  
supremacism.38-­‐40	  Reworking	  a	  range	  of	  models	  used	  by	  advocates	  of	  climate’s	  
determining	  role	  in	  civil	  wars,	  Buhaug	  contends	  that	  ‘Climate	  variability	  is	  a	  poor	  
predictor	  of	  armed	  conflict’	  and	  that	  civil	  wars	  in	  Africa	  are	  far	  better	  explained	  by	  
such	  conditions	  as	  ‘prevalent	  ethno-­‐political	  exclusion,	  poor	  national	  economy,	  and	  
the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  system’.	  The	  prehistory	  of	  a	  particular	  violent	  episode	  is	  
relevant	  too	  for,	  as	  he	  puts	  it,	  ‘recent	  violence	  may	  affect	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  new	  
conflict	  breaking	  out’	  (Ref.	  38,	  p.	  16480).	  	  
Empirical	  inquiries	  like	  these,	  which	  challenge	  the	  assumption	  that	  climate	  and	  
climate	  change	  are	  prime	  causes	  of	  violence,	  raise	  troubling	  concerns	  about	  the	  ease	  
with	  which	  an	  ideology	  of	  climate	  reductionism	  has	  infiltrated	  its	  way	  into	  national	  
security	  consciousness.41-­‐42	  Critics	  of	  this	  determinist	  turn,	  and	  particularly	  of	  the	  
Malthusian	  assumption	  that	  increased	  environmental	  scarcity	  and	  migration	  
‘weaken	  states’	  and	  ‘cause	  conflicts	  and	  violence,’	  express	  grave	  concerns	  about	  the	  
lack	  of	  attention	  devoted	  to	  ascertaining	  ‘the	  ways	  that	  environmental	  violence	  
reflects	  or	  masks	  other	  forms	  of	  social	  struggle’43	  and	  about	  the	  too	  comfortable	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means	  by	  which	  ‘forms	  of	  technological	  engineering	  …	  reduce	  “solutions”	  to	  matters	  
of	  purely	  technical	  concern’.44	  For	  one	  thing	  such	  scenarios	  take	  outbreaks	  of	  
violence	  as	  merely	  the	  natural	  consequence	  of	  social-­‐evolutionary	  adaptation.	  
Climate	  reductionism	  thus	  facilitates	  the	  sense	  that	  war	  can	  be	  readily	  ‘naturalized	  
and	  depoliticized’	  in	  markedly	  similar	  ways	  to	  earlier	  climatic	  readings	  of	  the	  
American	  Civil	  War.	  	  As	  one	  group	  of	  researchers	  observe:	  ‘Some	  studies	  in	  
environmental	  security	  are	  in	  danger	  of	  promulgating	  a	  modern	  form	  of	  
environmental	  determinism	  by	  suggesting	  that	  climate	  conditions	  directly	  and	  
dominantly	  influence	  the	  propensity	  for	  violence	  among	  individuals,	  communities	  
and	  states.’	  When	  analysts	  ‘neglect	  the	  complex	  political	  calculus	  of	  governance’	  and	  
the	  remarkable	  ways	  in	  which	  human	  societies	  actually	  do	  cope	  with	  challenging	  
environments,	  they	  reach	  ‘conclusions	  that	  are	  little	  different	  from	  those	  ascribing	  
poverty	  to	  latitudinal	  location	  or	  lessened	  individual	  productivity	  to	  hot	  climates,	  as	  
was	  common	  in	  European	  and	  American	  scholarship	  about	  a	  century	  ago’.45	  
	  
CONCLUSION	  
In	  his	  celebrated	  Walden,	  first	  published	  in	  1854,	  David	  Henry	  Thoreau	  declared	  ‘Our	  
life	  is	  frittered	  away	  by	  detail	  …	  Simplify,	  simplify’.46	  That	  dictum,	  it	  might	  be	  said,	  
has	  been	  adopted	  by	  many	  over	  the	  centuries	  who	  have	  reduced	  war	  to	  the	  vagaries	  
of	  climate.	  Now	  it	  is	  capturing	  the	  imaginations	  of	  national	  security	  agencies,	  mass	  
media	  pundits,	  and	  the	  military.	  The	  payoffs	  of	  course	  are	  considerable.	  For	  if	  war	  
can	  simply	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  –	  to	  the	  empire	  of	  climate	  –	  then,	  as	  
John	  William	  Draper	  realised	  a	  century	  and	  a	  half	  ago,	  humanity	  is	  well-­‐nigh	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